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Abstract
The important ows of irregular migration could not exist without the emergence of a criminal market
for smuggling services. A matching model à la Pissarides (2000) provides a well-suited framework to
analyze such a ow market with signicant trade frictions. Our analysis considers the competitive
segment of this underground market in which small-business smugglers can freely enter. The model
allows us to determine the equilibrium number of smugglers, the matching probability, the number of
successful irregular migrants and, as an original concept, the equilibrium migrant welfare. Changes in
parameters can be related to the various policies implemented by destination countries to cut down
irregular migration.
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1 Introduction
In the last few years, migratory ows from developing to developed countries have intensied;
populations in several developing countries were exposed to major distress due to wars,
ethnical conicts, and economic di¢ culties driven by internal factors (poor economic policies,
corruption, deteriorating terms of trade) or external factors such as climate change. On the
other hand, with a few exceptions, developed countries did little to improve their migrant
absorption capacity, despite a declining population. In this context, irregular migratory
ows became a substantial component of total migratory ows (Ambrosini, 2016; Vespe et
al., 2017; Naiditch and Vranceanu, 2017).
In turn, these massive ows of irregular migration led to the development of a new
black market for migrant smuggling services. The UN Protocol Against the Smuggling of
Migrants (2000) denes migrant smuggling as the procurement, in order to obtain, directly
or indirectly, a nancial or other material benet, of the illegal entry of a person into a State
Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident.1 Smuggling is the
prot-making business of illegally carrying migrants across borders; contrary to tra¢ cking,
it does not require an element of exploitation, coercion, or violation of human rights (IOM,
2019). Salt and Stein (1997) were the rst to describe in a systematic way the successive
stages of smuggling, and the complex nature of the smuggling activities. Smugglers would
provide migrants with the logistics for their long and risky journey, including planning (based
on their knowledge of the routes and risks), minimal shelter and food, means of transports,
fake documents, would assure their protection against robbery and other crimes, sometimes
would bribe o¢ cials to close their eyes when they cross the controls.
Data on irregular migration, smuggling, and human tra¢ cking are by denition extremely
1 Art. 3(a), UN Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000.
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di¢ cult to gather. An inuential Europol report (Europol, 2016), drafted immediately after
the 2015 peak in irregular migration to the EU from poor and war areas in the Middle East
and in the Horn of Africa, documents that more than 90% of the incoming migrants were
facilitated by criminal networks, whose turnover in 2015 could have totaled between 3 and
6 billion euros. One can read from the website of the United Nations O¢ ce on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC) that:
Criminals are increasingly providing smuggling services to irregular migrants
to evade national border controls, migration regulations and visa requirements.
Most irregular migrants resort to the assistance of prot-seeking smugglers. As
border controls have improved, migrants are deterred from attempting to illegally
cross them themselves and are diverted into the hands of smugglers.2
According to the UNODC, there is evidence that, at a minimum, 2.5 million migrants
were smuggled worldwide, for an economic return of US$ 5.5-7 billion in 2016 (UNODC,
2018).3 More recently, Frontex interviewed newly arrived migrants in the Mediterranean
area and found that 84% of the migrants interviewed used smugglers services, while only 7%
of them arrived in Europe without the help of smugglers (Frontex, 2019: 28).
Given the substantial consequences of irregular migration, it goes beyond a say that
scholars should understand and provide explanations about the organization of the market
for smuggling services. In this paper, we analyze the market for migrant smuggling services
in a modern matching framework that acknowledges the substantial trade frictions specic
to this environment. In particular, we study the e¤ect of policies intended to curb irregular
migration on the number of smugglers and the level of the smuggling fee, as well as on the
2 As accessed on 26/05/2019:
www.unodc.org/unodc/en/ human-tra¢ cking/migrant-smuggling-a-deadly-business.html
3 See also the country-specic analyses by McAuli¤e and Laczko (2016).
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number of irregular migrants and the intertemporal utility of migrants.
Despite the documented importance of the smugglers as facilitators of irregular migration,
theoretical investigations of this activity are relatively scarce. Gathman (2008) introduces a
cost/benet analysis to explain smugglerschoice of the crossing border point. Djajic and
Vinogradova (2019) use a dynamic, intertemporal cost/benet analysis to determine the mi-
gration strategy of a low-skilled worker who can choose between legal temporary migration
and long term irregular migration. Several papers have analyzed the nancial relationship
between migrants and the criminal smuggling organization as a provider of transport ser-
vices as well as nancial resources. Building on the assumptions that many candidates to
migration do not have the funds to pay for the smuggling fee, they study the debt contract
between the migrant and the criminal organization, which in many cases involves migrant
exploitation once he/she reaches the destination, and, in some cases, leads the migrant to
default on his/her "obligations" (Friebel and Guriev, 2006; Tamura, 2010, 2013; Djajic and
Vinogradova, 2014).
The UNODC (2018: 6) uses a traditional supply and demand setting to analyze the
market for migrants smuggling. On the supply side, the UN report indicates that "smugglers
advertise their business where migrants can be easily reached, such as in neighborhoods home
to diaspora communities, in refugee camps or in various social networks online". They explain
that migrants demand for smuggling services is "determined by socio-economic conditions,
family reunication as well as persecution, instability or lack of safety in origin countries".
Similar to any market, the smuggling market involves a price paid by migrants to smugglers
for their service, the smuggling fee. Petros (2005) reports that smuggling fees depend on the
distance travelled, the mode of transport, the number and characteristics of people being
moved, and of circumstantial conditions. Studying the smuggling market to Europe in the
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mid 2010, Abdel Aziz et al. (2015: 28) emphasize that "the growth in the number of migrants
who can a¤ord to pay high prices for their travels is a decisive factor boosting the smuggling
networks". Through the interviews of migrants newly arrived in Europe, Frontex documents
that the migrants who reached Italy from Turkey spent on average EUR 5000 per person for
smuggling services (Frontex, 2019: 28).
Auriol and Mesnard (2016) introduce the rst industrial organization model of the market
for smuggling services. The number of smuggler criminal organizations is given; they engage
in monopolistic competition à la Cournot, choosing smuggling fees to maximize the prot
(rent). The optimal smuggling fee depends on the elasticity of demand and the number of
smuggling organizations. Migrants with heterogenous productivity choose between buying a
visa and migrate legally, or paying the smuggling fee and migrate illegally.
The majority of existing studies on smuggling focus on the most e¤ective ways to prevent
irregular migration (although authorizing for an increasing number of legal migrants might be
an interesting mean to increase the welfare of both migrants and host countries as evidenced
by Moraga and Rapoport, 2014) and advocate for tighter border control and stricter labor-
law enforcement policies. This orientation reects the general understanding that illegal
migration only exists because of the smuggling industry, leading to widespread agreement
that the industry should be tackled both for humanitarian and strategic reasons(Friebel et
al., 2018).
Friebel and Guriev (2006) show that an increase in the strictness of border controls
decreases migration of both skilled and unskilled migrants. Tamura (2010) suggests that
migratory ows should be restricted by tighter border controls rather than inland controls.
In some cases, increasing the probability and sanction for inland migrant exploitation may
increase the total number of smugglers, who would shift to providing non-exploitative ser-
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vices. Djajic and Vinogradova (2014) argue that, when migrants can choose how to nance
their migration (in a long-run perspective), increasing border-control measures does not have
an impact on the total number of smuggled migrants because migrants would switch from
debt-bonded migration to self-nanced migration. Djajic and Michael (2014) investigate how
tougher transit cost over a neighboring country can reduce migration. Auriol and Mesnard
(2016) show that a combination of tight border controls with the sale of a large number of
visas would be an optimal policy, as it would at the same time limit the number of irregular
migrants and prevent excessive concentration of the smuggling market (at the cost of increas-
ing drastically the number of legal migrants). Borjas and Cassidy (2019) show that the legal
restrictions on the employment of undocumented workers in the United States of America
entail a penalty on the wage of the irregular migrants in the hidden segment of the labor
market; similarly, Guriev et al. (2019) show that, in Italy, the e¤ectiveness of immigration
policies is linked to labor market regulation (see also Orrenius and Zavodny, 2015).
Previous studies deliver many useful insights on the market for migrant smuggling ser-
vices, but su¤er from some drawbacks. First, most of these analyses do not account for the
important trade frictions specic to criminal markets, cannot explain migratory ows includ-
ing the "push-back" phenomenon (the fact that migrants that are caught during the journey
are sent back and may try to cross the border over and over again),4 and cannot provide
an intertemporal evaluation of the gains and benets for both smugglers and candidates to
migration. The purpose of our study is to address these issues, by developing a dynamic ow
model of the market for smuggling services, inspired by the matching labor market model by
Pissarides (2000).5 This approach acknowledges the fact that trade frictions are a built-in
4 Some witnesses state that some migrants tried to cross border fteen times or more.
See The Economist, August 8, 2019, "Migrant arrivals in Italy have tumbled", online at:
www.economist.com/europe/2019/08/08/migrant-arrivals-in-italy-have-tumbled
5 See also Cahuc et al. (2014) for a clear exposition of this model and its extensions.
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characteristic of these illegal and opaque markets. Candidates to migration cannot shop for
smugglers in the same way as consumers shop for services. They can wait a long period
before they get in touch with a smuggler. The Frontex report (2019) reveals that smugglers
make use of social media (pre-dominantly Facebook) to advertise their business. World-of-
mouth communications are also an important recruiting channel. Lack of mutual trust might
lead to unsuccessful matches even when a rst contact is established. This mutual search
process has been acknowledged long ago by Salt and Stein (1997). A matching function à
la Pissarides can therefore be a useful device to model these trade frictions. The original
contribution of our paper is to model in an explicit way the trade frictions specic to this
opaque market, and to use a ow analysis instead of a traditional stock analysis.
Second, the industrial organization of the market for migrant smuggling services may
range from a cartel with large criminal organizations to a competitive market between small
(family) rms. A few years ago, Gathman (2008) noticed that since little is known about
the supply of smuggler services, both perfect competition and collusive monopoly are inter-
esting modeling strategies. In their industrial organization analysis of the smuggling market,
Auriol and Mesnard (2016) consider that the smuggling services are provided by a closed
oligopoly of criminal organizations, similar to the drug cartels. Some recent eld reports
suggest that the alternative assumption of a more competitive organization of the market
where independent small businesses can enter freely can be relevant with respect to the new
migration routes from the Middle East and the Horn of Africa toward Europe. In a recent
report on smuggling in the Mediterranean area, Abdel Aziz et al. (2015: 24) claim that
"small and ephemeral groups participate in the business as well as large and highly profes-
sionalized networks. The players in the smuggling market can be organized in a large variety
of ways, from structured criminal groups to individual occasional smugglers" and also that
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"in general, however, the backbone of the smuggling industry does not seem to be based on
highly structured and hierarchical organizations". The UNODC (2018) indicates that these
smuggling small businesses are important players in this market, next to the criminal cartels
with a strong hierarchical organization. Campana (2018) performed an in-depth empirical
analysis of the structure and activities of a smuggling ring operating between the Horn of
Africa and Northern Europe via Libya, and revealed that activities are segmented and car-
ried out by localized and rudimentary hierarchies with largely independent and autonomous
higher-level smugglers. There are also indications of competition among them.6 Therefore,
to account for this documented decentralization of the market, in this paper we use a version
of the small rmmatching model.7
Third, most of the literature analyzes a relationship between smugglers and migrants,
where smugglers take advantage of the migrants. However, Achilli and Sanchez (2017) em-
phasize the complex nature of the migrants/smugglers relationship. They argue that smug-
glers, if they care about their prots, are not necessarily the selsh reckless persons that most
economic papers tend to suggest. They reveal some form of cooperation between smugglers
and migrants, as a "rudimentary form of human security from below". Besides, they show
that the nancial relationship between the two groups is not necessarily characterized by a
debt contract, and that many migrants nance their journey by selling assets (houses) or
though loans from relatives. In our model, we introduce some form of negotiation between
the smugglers and the migrants (on the level of the smuggling fee), in order to allow for a
reasonable mix of self-interest and cooperation, in line with the observations from the eld
(Achilli and Sanchez, 2017; Frontex, 2019). We also assume that migrants self-nance their
6 See also Sanchez (2017) who presents the social and demographic characteristics of the smugglers acting
in the illegal migration business to the US.
7 Our dynamic model could be extended to the case of a closed cartel of smugglers able to extract positive
rents, similar to the "large rm" matching model in labor economics.
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migration.
In our model, every day, new locals become candidates to migration; some of them nd a
smuggler, pay the fee up-front and undertake the risky migration journey. Some will succeed
in crossing the borders of the destination countries, while others are caught (with their
smugglers) by the authorities and sent back to the country of origin (while the smugglers
are convicted). To keep the model as simple as possible, we assume that the number of new
candidates to migration at each period is constant, and focus on the steady state equilibrium.
The model allows to analyze how the numbers of smugglers and irregular migrants as well
as the smuggling fee vary with key policy variables related to the smuggling costs and to
the chances of successfully crossing the borders (without being caught by the authorities).
As an original development, this paper studies the consequences of various policies not only
on the number of irregular migrants reaching the destination countries, but also on the
intertemporal utility of the candidates to migration. We mainly analyze the consequences of
higher smuggling costs (xed and variable), and of a higher probability for the migrant and
the smuggler to be caught during their journey. The model applies essentially to refugees,
who are less sensitive to policies implemented by destinations countries to deter irregular
migration, but could be extended to economic irregular migrants.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the structure of the
model and the main assumptions, while the results of the model are provided in Section 3.
Section 4 presents the insights from the comparative statics analysis and Section 5 concludes.
2 The matching function and the intertemporal values
2.1 The matching function
In a two-country world where one country (the destination country) attracts migrants from
the other one (the origin country), let M be the number of candidates to irregular migration
8
(or potential migrants) at each time period and let S denote the number of smugglers (an
endogenous variable in the model). In this paper, we analyze only the most plausible situation
in which the number of potential migrants exceeds the number of smugglers, S < M . A
smuggler can meet more than one migrant, and provide support to the group of migrants he
got in touch with.8 We denote by H the number of migrants who manage to get in touch
with smugglers, with H  M: We therefore make a distinction between M , which includes
all candidates to migration and H, which counts only the candidates to migration who found
a smuggler and can engage in the high-risk migration journey.
In a frictionless market, all migrants would meet a smuggler, H = M: In a market with
trade frictions, at any time period some migrants do not nd a smuggler, thus H < M: We
assume that these informational frictions can be captured by a matching function inspired
by the labor market model (Pissarides, 2000; Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001), in which
the number of successful matches is positively related to the numbers of smugglers and
candidates to migration: H = H (M;S) ; with @H=@M > 0 and @H=@S > 0. Following the
same literature, we assume that the matching function presents constant returns to scale. A
Cobb-Douglas function has these desirable properties, and will allow us to obtain analytical
expressions for the equilibrium solution. More precisely, we assume that the number of
successful matches is given by:
H (M;S) = MS1 , with  2 (0; 1); (1)
where  (respectively 1 ) is the elasticity of the number of successful matches with respect
to M (respectively S).9 The elasticity  is indicative of the e¢ ciency of the matching
process; since S < M; @H=@ > 0. For  = 1, we obtain the special case of the frictionless
8 This assumption contrasts with the standard labor market model where if more than one unemployed
person apply for a vacant job, only one of them will be accepted.
9 We can easily check that this function has the correct properties: 8 2 (0; 1) and S < M; H (M;S) 2
(S;M).
9
market; for  = 0; H = S: every smuggler meets on average one migrant only.10
We dene  as the smuggler per potential migrant ratio:
 =
S
M
 1: (2)
The mean number of smuggled migrants per smuggler is:
h () =
H (M;S)
S
=    1; (3)
with h0() =  h () =  0.
Given the matching process, the ex-ante probability for a candidate to migration to nd
a smuggler is:
g () =
H (M;S)
M
= 1   1; (4)
with g0() = (1  )h ()  0.
Obviously, , h () and g () are related, the number of candidates to migration who meet
a smuggler being equal to the number of smugglers times the mean number of migrants per
smuggler:
Mg () = Sh (), g () = h () : (5)
2.2 The two stages
The time structure of the model includes two distinct stages. During the rst stage, candi-
dates to migration and smugglers strive to meet each other. Migrants search for a smuggler
and either nd one (with probability g ()), or dont. At the end of this stage, each smuggler
has found on average h () candidates to migration to be smuggled to the destination country.
During the second stage, those who did not nd a smuggler continue searching, and those
who found one undertake their dangerous journey from the origin country to the destination
10 The Cobb-Douglas specication does not allow us to study a situation where the number of matches is
lower than the number of smugglers (H < S). This is not a major restriction as far as the number of smugglers
is small relatively to the number of migrants.
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country. Smugglers and smuggled migrants have a probability  to successfully reach the
destination country: at the end of the second stage, they have either reached the destination
country, or were stopped by the border police.11 In the latter case, candidates to migration
are sent back to their origin country, and smugglers are convicted.
Figure 1 presents the ow diagram of the model (from the perspective of the migrants).
The Flow Diagram
We assume that the number of new candidates to migration is constant and equal to N (it
structurally depends on the conditions in the countries of origin of candidates to migration).
In this respect, the model ts best the situation of refugees, whose decision to leave the
country of origin is not a¤ected by economic variables in the destination countries. An
analysis of economic migration could build on this simplied version, by relating N to key
economic variables.
At any time t, the relationship between the number of candidates to migration (Mt) and
the (constant) number of new candidates (N) is:
Mt = N + [1  g ()]Mt 1; (6)
11 Smugglers and migrants may also be stopped by other external shocks (natural events, conicts, etc.),
leading them not to reach their destination. It can also be argued that migrants may be caught without their
smuggler. This would imply to add another probability for the migrants to be stopped alone. Including this
additional parameter would not change the main results of the model.
11
since the number of candidates to migration at time t (Mt) is the sum of the new candidates
(N) and the previous candidates who did not succeed in migrating.The latter group includes
those who did not meet a smuggler ([1  g ()]Mt 1) and those who met one but did not
succeed in crossing the border ((1  ) g ()Mt 1). Because [1  g ()] < 1, equation (6) is
dynamically stable.
Our analysis focuses on the steady-state (or long-run) equilibrium: The long-run equi-
librium number of candidates to migration per period, M; is the solution to the recursive
equation (6) for Mt = Mt 1 = M :
M =
N
g ()
; (7)
where the ratio  is an endogenous variable. After any shock to this dynamic system (due to
policy changes for instance), the long run number of candidates to migration will gradually
adjust to the new long run value, after a more or less lengthy process.
2.3 Intertemporal values
2.3.1 The intertemporal value of the smuggler
Let V S be the intertemporal utility of a smuggler who searches for a candidate to migration.
At every search period, the smuggler incurs a xed cost c (advertising his business, planning
the best route to migrate and maintaining contacts along the route, corruption...), which
might include a stigma of a person involved in illegal activities. On average, in stage 1, he
nds h () candidates to migration, with whom he engages in a risky journey. The journey
involves a cost l per migrant (transportation, guiding and escorting during irregular border
crossing, shelter along the route, food, bribes, counterfeit documents...).
Abdel Aziz et al. (2015) who studied the migration route in the Mediterranean area,
report that for long journeys, the smuggling fee is paid in advance, step by step, through
the Hawala or Western Union methods of payment. For other routes, especially for migrants
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coming from West Africa, one-shot and one-border smuggling services are usually purchased
at the border with Libya. We thus assume that the smuggler charges (in advance) to the
migrant a "smuggling fee" w, whether or not the ride is successful.12 The cash-in-advance
assumption implicitly requires that the migrant can a¤ord to pay this fee; so doing, he has
sold assets, used his savings or borrowed from family. However, it must be acknowledged
that this negotiated smuggling fee might exceed the immediate cash resources of the migrant.
In this case, the migrant will commit to pay the di¤erence later, which is tantamount for him
to enter in a debt contract with the smuggler. This additional complexity would not change
in a substantial way our conclusions. It would require to add a debt term to be paid to the
smuggler only if the migrant successfully crossed the border of the destination country.
During the journey (stage 2), the authorities may catch the smuggler and the migrants
with a probability  = (1   ),  being the probability of success. If they are caught, the
candidate to migration is sent back to his home country, where he engages again in the search
for a smuggler13 , and the smuggler is sent to jail and pushed out of the smuggling business;
this is tantamount to a cost K > 0 incurred by the smuggler. If they are not caught, the
migrant stays in the destination country, and the smuggler comes back to his origin country
at the end of the journey and continues his smuggling activities.
Denoting by r the interest rate, we can write the expected intertemporal utility of a
smuggler in a brief period of time dt > 0 as:
V S = [ c+ h () (w   l)] dt+ exp ( rdt) dt ( K) + (1  dt)V S : (8)
12 Tamura (2010), on the opposite, assumes that the fee is paid only if the migrant has been smuggled as
agreed. Here, we implicitely assume that there is no commitment issue for the smuggler (he will strive to
smuggle the candidate to migration once he is paid).
13 Di¤erent reports point out to the outrageous situation where thousands of people die every year on the
migration roads (Achily ans Sanchez 2017, EUFRA, 2019). The structure of the problem would not change
much if we include in the model a second probability that the migrant dies on the road, to which we associate
a highly negative payo¤.
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For dt decreasing towards 0, the former expression simplies to (see Appendix A1):
V S =
h () (w   l)  [c+ (1  )K]
r + (1  ) : (9)
V S is a decreasing function of : for a given smuggling fee (higher than the marginal cost
of the smuggling activities), if more smugglers enter the market, competition among them
becomes more intense, the average number of candidates to migration per smuggler decreases,
and the intertemporal utility of the smuggler declines.
2.3.2 The intertemporal value of the candidate to migration
Let VM denote the intertemporal utility of a candidate to migration who searches for a
smuggler. The candidate to migration has a (small) benet z  0 of living in his country
of origin. z may be an o¢ cial aid for subsistence or the love of the candidate to migration
for his country of origin (it could also be negative if the candidate to migration is subject to
permanent threats).
In stage 1, with the probability g() the candidate to migration nds a smuggler, pays him
the smuggling fee w and starts the migration journey. Then, in stage 2, there is a probability
 that his/her group of migrants guided by the smuggler successfully crosses the border.
In that case, the migrant enjoys the intertemporal value of the successful migration (the
discounted ow of his future income in the destination country) denoted by Y , which depends
on the economic conditions in the destination country, but also on policies implemented in
this country to ght against undocumented workers and migrants (Orrenius and Zavodny,
2015; Borjas and Cassidy, 2019; Guriev et al., 2019). However, with probability (1  ) the
group of migrants is caught and sent back to their country of origin. In that case, they start
again to search for a smuggler, along with the candidates to migration who did not nd a
smuggler in stage 1.
In a brief period of time dt > 0, the expected intertemporal utility of the migrant (before
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he/she has found a smuggler) is therefore:
VM = [z   g()w] dt+ exp ( rdt)g()dtY + (1  g()dt)VM	 : (10)
For dt decreasing towards 0, the former expression simplies to (see Appendix A1):
VM =
z + g() (Y   w)
r + g()
: (11)
VM is an increasing function of :
dVM
d
=
g0() (Y   w) (r + g())  g0() [z + g() (Y   w)]
(r + g())2
(12)
dVM
d
=
r (1  )h ()
(r + g())2
h


Y   z
r

  w
i
 0: (13)
The expression [ (Y   z=r)  w] is positive: there would be no candidate to migration if
the net expected benet of a successful migrant were below the smuggling fee. For a given
smuggling fee, if the number of smugglers S (and thus ) increases, this is tantamount to a
higher probability to nd a smuggler for each candidate, and higher competition for migrants
between smugglers, which should be benecial to the former.
3 Solving the model
3.1 The free-entry condition (SS)
As revealed by the reports surveyed in the introduction, the organization of the smuggling
market can be very complex with large cartels and small-business smugglers complementing
each other and sometimes ghting to provide similar services (UNODC, 2018). There is
recent evidence that, at least in the smuggling market carrying migrants from the Horn of
Africa to Europe via Libya, most of the smuggling activity is carried out by small businesses,
run by largely independent and autonomous higher-level smugglers that compete between
them to provide services to a limited number of candidates to migration (Campana, 2018;
Abdel Aziz et al., 2015). The same studies suggest that barriers to entry into this business
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are small; as documented by Sanchez (2017), many smugglers are unsuccessful candidates to
migration, who use their experience to settle as mugglers. Field evidence also reveals that
smugglers seize very quickly new opportunities to extend their criminal activities, as the
opening of the Libyan route to the EU has shown (Friebel et al., 2018).
In line with this empirical evidence, we consider smugglers as entrepreneurs, owners of
"small rms" made up of a small number of relatives and close friends. These entrepreneurs
in criminal activities can freely and rapidly enter the smuggling market; thus prot from
smuggling is quickly driven down to the prot from their best alternative activity, denoted
by v. When a smuggler is convicted and pushed out of the smuggling business, another
smuggler will enter the market, in keeping to the prot indi¤erence condition. This model-
ing framework is consistent with facts reported by Campana (2018), who notices that "the
presence of multiple independent smugglers in competition among themselves makes it likely
that, following the removal of an individual smuggler, the remaining smugglers will try to
seize this opportunity to acquire his marketshare".
The free entry condition V S = v determines , and thus the number of smugglers S, as a
function of w; this relationship can be seen as a "smuggler supply" (SS) function,  = (w).14
For analytical convenience, we prefer to express it as the reciprocal function w = w().
Using eq. (9), we get:
w = l +
c+ vr + (1  ) (v +K)
h ()
: (14)
Because h is decreasing in , the relationship between  and w is positive. All else equal,
a higher fee w would attract more smugglers, thereby increasing . A new equilibrium is
obtained as the entry of new smugglers decreases h, and brings V S down to v.
14 The free-entry condition is somehow similar to the job-creation condition in the Pissarides (2000) frame-
work; here, smuggler "jobs" are created in the black market.
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3.2 The smuggling fee equation (WN)
The successful match between the smuggler and the candidate to migration creates value
for both of them. How this total surplus is divided between the smuggler and the migrant
depends on the fee w, as negotiated between them. Rational agents would agree on a Nash
Bargaining Solution (Nash, 1950) to determine the outcome of an e¢ cient negotiation, that
would not waste any of the surplus. Thus, we implement this solution to determine the
negotiated wage.
The Nash maximand is written as:
 =

VM
	1  
V S
	
; (15)
where we assume that the statu quo utilities are null, and  captures the relative bargaining
powers. It seems reasonable to consider that the negotiating power mostly sits with the
smugglers, i.e. that  is relatively large (although we do not need this assumption to solve
the model).
Denoting by ' the log of  and using equations (9) and (11) for V S and VM , the Nash
maximand becomes:
' = (1  ) ln

z + g() (Y   w)
r + g()

+  ln

h () (w   l)  c  (1  )K
r + (1  )

(16)
= (1  ) fln [z + g() (Y   w)]  ln [r + g()]g
+ fln [h () (w   l)  c  (1  )K]  ln [r + (1  )]g : (17)
The First Order Condition d'dw = 0 yields the negotiated wage w as a function of ; which we
dene as the WN relationship:
w = Y + (1  ) l + z
g()
+
(1  ) [c+ (1  )K]
h ()
(18)
= 

Y +
z
g()

+
(1  ) [c+ (1  )K + lh ()]
h ()
(19)
=
c+ h () l + (1  )K
h ()
+ 

Y +
z
g()
  c+ h () l + (1  )K
h ()

: (20)
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The negotiated fee per migrant (w) covers the expected cost per migrant, plus a prot margin
increasing in the smugglers bargaining power, and in the migrants expected benet from
migration. It is positive (under the su¢ cient but not necessary condition z > 0).
The negotiated fee does not vary monotonously with :
dw
d
=  z g
0()
[g()]2
  (1  ) [c+ (1  )K] h
0()
[h()]2
: (21)
Since g () = h (), h0 () =  h () =, and g0 () = (1  )h (), we get:
dw
d
=   1
2h ()
f(1  )z    (1  ) [c+ (1  )K] g : (22)
The smuggling fee is an increasing function of  when:
dw
d
 0,   ~  1  


1  
z
c+ (1  )K : (23)
So w is decreasing with  for  < ~ and increasing with  for   ~. In the special case where
smugglers have all the bargaining power ( ! 1), the negotiated fee w is always decreasing
with .
We can analyze variations in w for a constant , or how the curve WN shifts when
parameters change. w increases with the marginal and xed costs (l and c) of the journey,
and with the cost K incurred by the smuggler when arrested. It also increases with the
intertemporal value Y of successful migration, and the benet z of the potential migrant in
his country of origin. Depending on the parameters, the negotiated fee w may increase or
decrease with the probability of success :
dw
d
= Y   (1  ) K
h ()
: (24)
If the weighted gain of a successful migration is higher than the cost per migrant incurred
by smugglers when arrested


1 Y  Kh()

, then the smuggling fee increases with the prob-
ability of success, and conversely. When smugglers have all the bargaining power ( ! 1),
the negotiated fee w unambiguously increases with the probability of success .
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3.3 The equilibrium
The equilibrium of this ow market is dened as the couple (w; ) which simultaneously
veries equations (14) and (18).
Figure 2 represents the two equations and the equilibrium values. Curves were numer-
ically simulated for the following parameter values: Y = 7:5; v = 5; K = 2; z = 0:05;
r = 0:10; l = 0:50; c = 0:50;  = 0:75;  = 0:50 and  = 0:75. We recall that  > 0:5
suggests that the bargaining power sits with the smugglers. The probability of success of 0:5
used in the simulation acknowledges that many migrants are caught during the journey, and
compelled to start their journey several times, a phenomenon referred to as "push back".
With these parameter values, the equilibrium smuggling fee is w = 3:20 and the smuggler
per potential migrant ratio is  = 0:50:
Equilibrium in the smuggling market
The denitions of V S and VM used to build the model require that there are more can-
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didates to migration than smugglers on the market, i.e.  < 1. As the numerical simulation
in Figure 2 shows, such an equilibrium can exist for meaningful parameter values. In the
Proof of Proposition 1, we present the formal restriction on parameters that guarantees the
existence of the solution.
Proposition 1 If a solution  2 (0; 1) exists, it is unique (under the su¢ cient condition
z  0).
Proof. The implicit denition of  is given by equalizing wages in equations (14) and (18):
l +
c+ (r + 1  ) v + (1  )K
h ()
= Y + (1  ) l + z
g()
+
(1  ) [c+ (1  )K]
h ()
(25)
(r + 1  ) v +  [c+ (1  )K]| {z }
LHS
= 
h
(Y   l)h () + z

i
| {z }
RHS()
: (26)
The LHS term is independent of  and positive. For z  0, since h () =   is decreasing
in , RHS is decreasing in , with lim
!0+
RHS () = +1 and lim
!+1
RHS () = 0. Then
equation (26) has a unique solution  in [0; +1[.
The solution  is lower than 1 if and only if LHS  RHS (1). This can be expressed as
a condition over the probability of success :
(r + 1  ) v +  [c+ (1  )K]   (Y   l + z),   ^  (1 + r) v +  (c+ l +K   z)
v +  (Y +K)
:
(27)
For z  0, if   ^, then there exists a unique solution  2 (0; 1).
4 Comparative statics
Policies implemented by the destination country to ght against illegal border crossing may
impact the cost of smuggling activities (c and l) as well as the probability of success ().
Policies aiming at containing irregular employment have an impact on the economic gains
associated with irregular migration (Y ). These two kinds of policies in turn impact the
equilibrium number of smugglers, given by the equilibrium ratio , as well as the mean
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number of smuggled migrants per smuggler, the nal number of smuggled migrants and the
smuggling fee. They also have an impact on the welfare of the candidates to migration.
4.1 The impact of policies on the equilibrium ; h; and w:
Proposition 2 In the equilibrium, the ratio of smugglers per potential migrant  is increas-
ing in Y and , and decreasing in c, l and K (under the su¢ cient condition z  0).
Proof. Cf. Appendix A.2.
Corollary 3 The equilibrium number of smuggled migrants per smuggler h is decreasing in
Y and , and increasing in c, l and K (under the su¢ cient condition z  0).
Proof. It follows from the fact that the equilibrium mean number of smuggled migrants per
smuggler h = ()  is decreasing in .
The equilibrium smuggling fee w = w () can be determined by means of any of the
two wage expressions (eq. 14 or 18).
Proposition 4 In the equilibrium, the smuggling fee w is increasing in Y , c, l and K (under
the su¢ cient condition z  0). With respect to , its variations are ambiguous (depending
on the parameters).
Proof. Cf. Appendix A.3.
Increasing the costs of smuggling activities will lead to an increase in the smuggling fee
paid by migrants to smugglers. These results are similar to those of Auriol and Mesnard
(2016). Besides, decreasing the gains associated with migration leads to a decrease in the
smuggling fee.
However, how the equilibrium smuggling fee reacts to a stricter border control that would
decrease the probability of successfully crossing borders depends on the parameters of the
problem. On the one hand, if the probability of success () increases, then the expected gains
of a successful migration (Y ) increase, driving up the smuggling fee. On the other hand,
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this increase in the probability implies a decrease in the expected cost of being convicted for
the smuggler ( K), driving down the smuggling fee. Such complex responses of important
endogenous variables to changes in key parameters are not uncommon in matching models,
and in general are addressed by calibration and numerical simulations.
4.2 A discussion of the short-run impact of policies
Most of the migration policies are unfortunately implemented to address short run tensions.
In the short run, the number of candidates to migrationM can be seen as invariant ("sticky"),
as policies will have an immediate e¤ect on  (via the fast adjustment of the number of
smugglers) and w: In the long run, after an initial policy shock, M will gradually converge
toward its new value as determined by equation (7).
For the equilibrium ratio , we can dene the short-run number of smugglers by s =
M and the short-run number of successful irregular migrants by m = Mg ().
Proposition 5 In the short-run, the number of successful irregular migrantsm is increasing
in Y and , and decreasing in c, l and K (under the su¢ cient condition z  0).
Proof. For a given number of candidates to migration, the equilibrium number of successfully
smuggled migrants is m = Mg (). Since M is constant and g is positive and increasing
in , Proposition 2 implies that the nal number of smuggled migrants increases with the
intertemporal value of successful migration (Y ) and the probability of successful migration
() but decreases with the xed (c) and marginal (l) costs of smuggling activities and the
intertemporal cost of being arrested (K).
In the long-run, the number of successful migrants is constant and equal to N : from
equation (7), we have Mg () = N ; all the candidates eventually succeed in migrating,
because they try over and over again.
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4.3 The welfare of the candidates to migration
Finally, we are interested in the e¤ect of parameter changes on the welfare of candidates to
migration as resulting from this equilibrium.
The net expected intertemporal utility of a (risk-neutral) candidate to migration will
feature three expected states of nature: he/she may either succeed in reaching the destination
country (with probability g ()), or fail to reach the destination, either because he/she did
not nd a smuggler (with probability [1  g ()]), or because the journey was discontinued
(with probability (1 )g ()). Denoting the equilibrium net expected intertemporal utility
by W , it can be expressed as:
W  = g ()

Y   w   z
r

+ [1  g ()]VM (; w) + (1  )g () VM (; w)  w(28)
= g ()

Y   w   z
r

+ [1  g ()]VM (; w)  (1  )g ()w (29)
= g ()

Y   z
r
  w


  VM (; w)

+ VM (; w) : (30)
Proposition 6 The expected intertemporal utility of a risk-neutral candidate to migration
W  is increasing in Y , and decreasing in c, l and K (under the su¢ cient condition z  0).
With respect to , its variations cannot be determined analytically.
Proof. Cf. Appendix A.4.
Any policy increasing the xed (c) and marginal (l) costs of smuggling activities, as well
as the cost of being arrested (K) would result in a decrease in the expected utility of the
candidate to migration: on the one hand, with higher costs the number of smugglers entering
this market is cut down, which reduces chances of the candidates to migration to reach the
destination country; on the other hand, smugglers remaining in the market will transfer part
of the higher costs to the migrants, charging a higher smuggling fee. While the rst e¤ect
could be in line with the usual goals of policymakers of the destination country, the second
e¤ect is a pure deterioration of the migrants welfare, that further draws them into economic
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fragility.
Employment controls and reduced social benets in the destination country that reduce
Y would also deteriorate the net expected utility of the candidate to migration, even if the
smuggling fee is decreased by these policies.
However, due to the complexity of the relationships specic to the matching model, the
welfare e¤ect of a change in the probability of success () cannot be determined analyti-
cally, in particular because the e¤ect of the change in  on the equilibrium smuggling fee is
ambiguous (depends on parameters).
In the short run, M is given and changes in the individual expected utility can be inter-
preted as changes in the overall welfare measured by an utilitarian collective welfare function.
The long run consequences of changes in parameters are more di¢ cult to infer, since they
impact not only the expected welfare of the candidates to migration, but also M; the total
number of candidates to migration, according to equation (7).
Table 1 summarizes the main e¤ects of parameter changes on the endogenous variables,
as determined analytically.
c l K Y 
       + +
h + + +    
g       + +
m       + +
w + + + + ?
W        + ?
Table 1: Summary of the main policy e¤ects. Note: short run e¤ect for W* and m*
4.4 Numerical simulations
To remove the ambiguities related to the e¤ect of the probability of success on the smuggling
fee and the short-run migrant welfare, we follow a standard approach in matching models by
implementing a numerical simulation. It goes beyond the purpose of this paper to provide a
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precise calibration of the parameters. However, we make sure to have plausible parameters,
in line with the restrictions imposed by the theory.
Figures 3 and 4 present the evolution of the equilibrium smuggling fee (w) and the
equilibrium migrant welfare (W ), varying the probability of success from 0.33 to 0.60 (the
upper bound is given by the restriction  < 1; see Proof of Proposition 1). The other
parameters are similar to those used to draw Figure 1.
Equilibrium smuggling fee by probability of success
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Migrant welfare by probability of success
With these plausible parameter values, the smuggling fee is increasing in the probability
of success. This would explain the hump shape of the welfare function: for an extremely
high probability of success, the smuggler fee increases so much that the short run welfare
of the candidates to migration is actually decreasing (for a given number of candidates to
migration). This counterintuitive result is robust to changes in parameters around the values
of our simulation.15
5 Conclusion and policy implications
Irregular migration and migrant smuggling are two facets of the same phenomenon, and con-
trol of the former involves an action on the latter. Early studies have analyzed the market
for smuggling services as a typical supply and demand problem. While static supply and de-
15 The Maple instructions can be provided upon request.
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mand models are quite useful in analyzing transparent markets with exible prices and bring
about many useful insights, migrant smuggling, as any illegal activity, is an opaque business,
prone to signicant trade frictions. Furthermore, it involves massive ows of candidates to
migration, trying to meet those smugglers and ready to cross the borders several times until
they eventually succeed in reaching the destination country. We argue in this paper that the
labor market matching model (Pissarides, 2000) is best suited to analyze such a ow market
with trade frictions.
In our model, candidates to migration have no choice but to leave their country, while
destination countries do not open their borders. Therefore the only option left to these can-
didates to migration is to engage in irregular migration, with the support of "professionals"
of illegal border crossing, the smugglers. A rst industrial organization model of the market
for smuggling services was introduced by Auriol and Mesnard (2016), who analyzed the op-
timal pricing policies of smuggling organizations in an oligopoly market. Recent empirical
evidence on irregular migration from Africa to Northern Europe suggests that smugglers
often are organized as small businesses with a large degree of autonomy and independence
(Abdel Aziz et al., 2015; Sanchez, 2017, Campana, 2018). We therefore build our analysis on
the alternative assumption of a competitive segment of the smuggling sector, where criminals
organized as small family rms can enter freely the smuggling sector until their prots fall
down to the best alternative income. Candidates to migration meet smugglers with a match-
ing probability that depends on the frictions in the market. We model the matching process
by means of an original matching function inspired by the literature in labor economics, and
solve the model at the steady state equilibrium for the endogenous number of smugglers, the
probability of meeting a smuggler and the smuggling fee.
As expected, the numbers of smugglers, successful matches and migrants reaching desti-
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nation decrease with the costs associated to the smuggling activity. In particular, increasing
the controls and the cost of being arrested for the smuggler, and the probability to catch the
smuggler and the migrants during the journey, should contribute to reducing the number of
incoming migrants (in the short run). These ndings are in line with the results of existing
studies. Our analysis allows to study the e¤ect of these policies on the smuggling fee, and
warns policymakers on the dramatic consequences of a raising burden on migrants that are
already in an extremely fragile situation.
Most of the previous analyses neglect the perspective of the candidates to migration,
who, in many cases, have no option but to leave their country of origin or be exposed to life
threats and/or unbearable poverty. Thus, we use the model to provide a migrant welfare
analysis. As expected, higher costs of migration are eroding migrant welfare. Numerical
simulations show that the probability of succeeding, itself related to the means used by
developed countries to catch migrants and push them back, has an ambiguous e¤ect. As
expected, low probabilities of success have a negative impact on migrant welfare. However,
high probabilities of success might have a detrimental impact on the welfare of the candidates
to migration, mainly because it would raise the smuggling fee.
In the last few years, in particular after 2011, the massive migration ows across the
Mediterranean sea toward the EU countries, in extremely di¢ cult conditions for the migrants,
stuck in rusty boats abandoned by the smugglers at the mercy of the tempests, led to a
surge in private humanitarian initiatives. Many NGOs nanced search and rescue vessels
to patrol next to the Libyan borders, and provide life support to migrants under distress,
then ship them to safe harbors, most often in Italy. According to the report of the EU
Agency on Fundamental Rights (EUFRA, 2019), while in 2016 there were approximately
22 ships engaged in such activities, because of the legal actions by EU governments against
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these NGOs, in 2019 the number of actually operating ships declined to no more than three.
In general, these rescue initiatives solicited signicant controversies. Our model may allow
to better understand the multiple consequences of the presence of these rescue ships in
the Mediterranean. On the one hand, by lowering transportation costs and increasing the
probability of success, these initiatives raise the rents of the smugglers (in the rst place),
and will attract more smugglers in this activity, something that EU governments would like
to avoid. On the other hand, more migrants will successfully cross the sea, as chances to meet
a smuggler edge up; however, if lower transportation costs drive down the smuggling fee (and
thus increase the welfare of the candidates to migration), the e¤ect of a higher probability
of success on the smuggling fee is ambiguous, and one cannot rule out that higher smuggling
fees can, to some extent, deteriorate migrant welfare.
These conclusions are not independent from our assumptions, and some are more chal-
lenging than others. In our model, the probability of catching the migrants at the border is
exogenously given, and depends only on the resources allocated to the border and maritime
police. A more realistic model would link this probability to the size of the group of migrants
that a smuggler will guide. We did not explicitly formalize the possibility that sometimes the
journey ends in a dramatic way, with migrants losing their lives, in particular when crossing
seas. Also, restrictive policies can have an impact on the number of candidates to migra-
tion, in particular when the motive is economic. While in this paper we made the choice of
simplicity in order to emphasize the role of trading frictions and the ow dynamics of this
market, the simple matching model used here might be modied to take into account these
features.
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A Appendix
A.1 Intertemporal values, continous time
The intertemporal value of the smuggler
In a brief time period dt > 0, in stage 1 (see Figure 1), the representative smuggler incurs
the xed cost c, and meets h () candidates to migration who pays him the smuggling fee
w ; the smuggler also spends the variable cost l per matched migrant. In the second stage,
the smuggler may get caught while crossing the border (with probability dt) and then
incurs the intertemporal cost K; with the complementary probability (1  dt), he reaches
his destination and comes back to his country of origin where he goes on with his smuggling
activity. Thus, in a brief time period dt, the expected intertemporal utility of the smuggler
can be written:
V S = [ c+ h () (w   l)] dt+ exp ( rdt) dt ( K) + (1  dt)V S : (31)
For small values of dt; we can use the approximation exp ( rdt) = 11+rdt . Thus, the former
expression becomes (replacing  with 1   when necessary):
V S = [h () (w   l)  c] dt+ 1
1 + rdt

(1  dt)V S   dtK (A.32)
(1 + rdt)V S = [h () (w   l)  c] (1 + rdt) dt+ (1  dt)V S   dtK (A.33)
(r + ) dtV S = [h () (w   l)  c] (1 + rdt) dt  dtK (A.34)
V S =
[h () (w   l)  c] (1 + rdt)  (1  )K
r + (1  ) : (A.35)
With dt decreasing towards 0, the former expression simplies to:
V S =
h () (w   l)  [c+ (1  )K]
r + (1  ) ; (36)
which is equation (9) in the main text.
The intertemporal value of the migrant
32
In the brief time period dt > 0, in stage 1 (see Figure 1), the candidate to migration
receives z. With probability (1 g ()), the candidate to migration does not nd a smuggler;
with the complementary probability g (), he nds a smuggler and pays him w. In the
second stage, the candidates to migration who found a smuggler and succeed in reaching the
destination country (g()dt) get Y , all the others (1  g()dt) get VM . Thus, in a brief
time period dt, we have:
VM = [z   g()w] dt+ exp ( rdt)g()dtY + (1  g()dt)VM	(A.37)
VM = [z   g()w] dt+ 1
1 + rdt

g()dtY + (1  g()dt)VM	 (A.38)
(1 + rdt)VM = [z   g()w] (1 + rdt) dt+ g()dtY + (1  g()dt)VM (A.39)
(r + g()) dtVM = [z   g()w] (1 + rdt) dt+ g()dtY (A.40)
VM =
[z   g()w] (1 + rdt) + g()Y
r + g()
: (A.41)
With dt decreasing towards 0, the expression simplies to:
VM =
z + g() (Y   w)
r + g()
; (42)
which is equation (11) in the main text.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2 on 
Proof. The equilibrium smuggler per potential migrant ratio  is implicitely given by eq.
(26). Di¤erentiating this expression with respect to the parameters, we get:
dc+ (1  )dK   (v + K) d = h () (Y d + dY   dl)  k () d (A.43)
k () d =  dc  (1  ) dK + h () dY   h () dl(A.44)
+
1

[K + Y h () + v] d; (A.45)
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with k () = z
()2
  (Y   l)h0 (). For z > 0, we know that k ()  0. Thus, we get:
d
dY =
h()
k()  0 d

dc =   1k()  0
d
d =
K+Y h()+v
k()  0 d

dl =  h(
)
k()  0
d
dK =   1 k()  0:
(46)
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4 on w
Proof. Equation (14) gives the equilibirum smuggling fee as a function of the equilibrium
ratio :
w = l +
c+ (r + 1  ) v + (1  )K
h ()
: (47)
Since h0 () =  h () =, denoting A =  [c+ (r + 1  ) v + (1  )K]  0, the partial
derivative of the equilibrium smuggling fee with respect to Y is:
@w
@Y
=
A
h ()
@
@Y
 0: (48)
Thus, w is increasing in Y .
Similarly, the partial derivatives of the equilibrium smuggling fee with respect to c, l and
K are: 8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
@w
@c =
1
h()
h
1 + A
@
@c
i
@w
@l = 1 +
A
h()
@
@l
@w
@K =
1
h()
h
1   + A @

@K
i
:
(49)
Replacing the derivatives of  by their expressions given by eq. (46), we get:8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
@w
@c =
1
h()
h
1  Ak()
i
@w
@l = 1  Ak()
@w
@K =
1 
h()
h
1  Ak()
i
:
(50)
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Yet we know that k () = z+ (Y   l)h ()  0 andA =  [c+ (r + 1  ) v + (1  )K] 
0.
Using eq. (26) dening implicitely , we can rewrite k ():
(r + 1  ) v +  [c+ (1  )K] = 
h
(Y   l)h () + z

i
(A.51)
(r + 1  ) v +  [c+ (1  )K] = 

8>><>>:
h z

+  (Y   l)h ()
i
| {z }
k()
  (1  ) z

9>>=>>; (A.52)
k () =


(r + 1  ) v +  [c+ (1  )K] + (1  ) z

:(A.53)
It follows that:
k () A = 

(r + 1  ) v +  [c+ (1  )K] + (1  ) z

   [c+ (r + 1  ) v + (1  )K](A.54)
k () A = 

1  


(r + 1  ) v + (1  ) z

 0: (A.55)
Thus, k () is higher than A and w is increasing in c, l and K.
Finally, following the same reasoning with respect to the probability of a successful jour-
ney (), we get:
@w
@
=
1
h ()

A [K + Y h () + v]
k ()
  (v +K)

: (56)
From the implicit denition of  (eq. 53), we have:
k () =  (r + 1  ) v +  [c+ (1  )K] + (1  ) z

: (57)
Replacing A by its expression, it follows that:
@w
@
=
1
h () k ()
h
 (1  ) v (c  rK) +AY h ()  (1  ) (v +K) z

i
; (58)
with an unknown sign.
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 6 on W 
Proof. Equation (11) gives the equilibrium intertemporal value of a candidate to migration:
VM (; w) =
z + g() (Y   w)
r + g()
: (59)
Di¤erentiating this equation with respect to X = c, l or K, we get:
@VM (; w)
@X
=
h
@g()
@X (Y   w)  g()@w

@X
i
[r + g()]   @g()@X [z + g() (Y   w)]
[r + g()]2
(A.60)
@VM (; w)
@X
=
@g()
@X r


 
Y   zr
  w  g()@w@X [r + g()]
[r + g()]2
: (A.61)
Propositions 2 and 5 state that  and thus g () are decreasing inX and that w is increasing
in X. Thus @V
M (;w)
@X  0.
Then, from eq. (30), we di¤erentiate W  with respect to X = c, l or K:
@W 
@X
= 
@g()
@X

Y   z
r
  w


  VM (; w)

  g ()

1

@w
@X
+
@VM (; w)
@X

+
@VM (; w)
@X
(A.62)
@W 
@X
=
@g()
@X
n

h
Y   z
r

  VM (; w)
i
  w
o
+ [1  g ()] @V
M (; w)
@X
  g () @w

@X
:(A.63)
The di¤erence [
 
Y   zr
 VM (; w)] is the expected net surplus of the successful migrant,
which, at the equilibrium, should be larger than the smuggling fee if the candidate to migra-
tion accepts the smuggling contract. Therefore


 
Y   zr
  VM (; w)  w	  0 and
@W 
@X  0.
We follow the same reasoning for Y . First, we di¤erentiate VM with respect to Y :
@VM (; w)
@Y
=
[r + g()]
h
@g()
@Y (Y   w) + g()
 
   @w@Y
i   @g()@Y [z + g() (Y   w)]
[r + g()]2
(A.64)
@VM (; w)
@Y
=
@g()
@Y r


 
Y   zr
  w+ g() [r + g()]     @w@Y 
[r + g()]2
: (A.65)
Proposition 2 states that  and thus g () are increasing in Y . Besides, from eq. (46), (48)
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and (55), we have:
@w
@Y
=
A
h ()
@
@Y
=
A
h ()
h ()
k ()
(A.66)
@w
@Y
= 
A
k ()
 : (A.67)
Since


 
Y   zr
  w  0, then @VM (;w)@Y  0.
Then, we di¤erentiate W  with respect to Y :
@W 
@Y
= 
@g()
@Y

Y   z
r
  w


  VM (; w)

+ g()

1  1

@w()
@Y
  @V
M ()
@Y

+
@VM ()
@Y
(A.68)
@W 
@Y
=
@g()
@Y
n

h
Y   z
r

  VM (; w)
i
  w
o
+ [1  g()] @V
M ()
@Y
+ g()

   @w(
)
@Y

:(A.69)
Since


 
Y   zr
  VM (; w)  w	  0, we can conclude that @W @Y  0.
We follow the same reasoning for . First, we di¤erentiate VM with respect to :
@VM ()
@
=
[r + g()]
h
@g()
@ (Y   w) + g()

Y   @w()@
i
 
h
g() +  @g(
)
@
i
[z + g() (Y   w)]
[r + g()]2
(A.70)
@VM ()
@
=
@g()
@ r


 
Y   zr
  w+ g()r  Y   zr + g()w	  g() [r + g()] @w()@
[r + g()]2
(A.71)
@VM ()
@
=
@g()
@ r


 
Y   zr
  w+ g() r  Y   zr + g()w
[r + g()]2
  g(
)
r + g()
@w()
@
: (A.72)
Then, from eq. (29), we di¤erentiate W  with respect to :
@W 
@
=

g() + 
@g()
@
 h
Y   z
r
  VM (; w)
i
  g()@V
M ()
@
+
@VM ()
@
  @g(
)
@
w   g()@w(
)
@
(A.73)
@W
@
=
@g()
@
n

h
Y   z
r

  VM (; w)
i
  w
o
(A.74)
+ [1  g()] @V
M ()
@
+ g()

Y   z
r
  VM (; w)  @w(
)
@

; (A.75)
with an undetermined sign.
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